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Lawfare is a recently coined term which in its broadest sense refers to the involvement of legal process in modern day warfare. Lawfare can range from litigation in federal or international courts to the exploitation of U.S. Rules of Engagement. It can also be defined as using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve a strategic or operational military objective. This paper examined specific legal cases where the misuse of legal process was alleged, including accusations that detainees were instructed by Al Qaeda trainers to bring false claims of torture to influence public opinion against the United States and drain resources through protracted litigation.
Supreme Court decisions were examined with an eye toward any deleterious effects on military operations. I have concluded that litigation lawfare is largely a myth and that cases decided by the Supreme Court provided a much needed check on executive authority. The threat of lawfare was overstated and was adequately handled by our judicial system.
LAWFARE: A CURRENT THREAT OR MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?

Concept of Lawfare
The term "lawfare" is becoming a widely used term among military and legal scholars though it is used in different ways depending on one's point of view. Some writers and policy makers use the term in a pejorative sense referring to our enemy's use of legal process to the disadvantage of the United States as "engaging in lawfare" implying a misuse of the law. One of the earliest writers to directly address the concept was Major General Charles Dunlap who wrote a series of articles on lawfare. Dunlap, formerly The Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, initially defined it as "a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective." 1 He observed that one dimension of lawfare being use by U.S. opponents was "a cynical manipulation of the rule of law and the humanitarian values it represents." 2 That is to say, for example, our opponents highlighting the civilian casualties that are inevitable in armed conflict, playing on both U.S. and world public opinion in an attempt to limit our use of military power. Tactically, the enemy's use of lawfare could include hiding in mosques so they could claim the U.S. was destroying religious objects or by falsely claiming torture when captured. 3 Dunlap later clarified and refined his definition posing a more expansive interpretation as "the strategy of using -or misusing -law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective." 4 This definition is contrasted by the views of some of the lawyers in the George W. Bush administration such as Jay Bybee, John Yoo and Alberto Gonzales, who viewed the use of legal process as an unlawful tactic used by our enemies, abetted by attorneys taking 2 issue with government policies. 5 Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, thinking more in global terms defined lawfare as the "judicialization of international politics." 6 Rumsfeld's concern was that weaker nations might seek indictments against U.S. officials in foreign domestic courts or international forums like the International Criminal
Court, for actions taken in response to the 9/11 attacks. In addition to the foregoing there is also the concept of "reverse lawfare" wherein the administration would take preemptive steps to deny the applicability of legal restrictions on operations such as choosing a detention location beyond U.S. court jurisdiction and supervision. 7 While there is no universally accepted definition the concept is subject to examination so long as the context in which the term is used remains clear. 19 The goal to avoid judicial involvement was soon thwarted by a rapid succession of legal filings by the defense lawyers, both civilian and military, challenging the continued detention of individuals who were held at Guantanamo Bay. 20 Lawfare it seemed had just begun.
Challenging Detention
One element of lawfare, detested by many in the Bush administration was the notion that a terrorist, assisted by a U.S. attorney no less, could challenge his very detention by military forces and seek release from custody. 21 Under different circumstances a terrorist act could be treated as a criminal act and all the protections of due process would be available to the defendant to challenge detention. Protections are built into the system such as the requirement for a prosecutor to make at least a minimal offer of proof to a neutral judge that would justify holding a suspect in jail upon filing a charge. No such mechanism exists for captured enemies during wartime. No questions arose during World War II when U.S. forces captured and detained German or Japanese soldiers, nor did the U.S. challenge the notion that its own captured 5 soldiers were subject to detention. That capture and detention are incident to war has been well established not only by universal practice but in previous decisions by our own Supreme Court. 22 How was this conflict different, and what was it that gave rise to the notion that a captured enemy soldier could challenge his very detention by the nation that he had attacked? Was the strategy of lawfare at work whereby the terrorists would misuse America's own legal system against the government to gain unfair advantage?
Rasul v. Bush
As previously stated the U.S. responded to the 9/11 attacks by choosing a military response rather than a criminal proceeding. Upon determination that the attack was orchestrated by Al Qaeda, which trained and quartered itself in Afghanistan with cooperation from the Taliban controlled government, it was decided to send military forces "to identify the terrorists, disrupt their activities and eliminate their ability to conduct further attacks." 23 The follow up Executive Order authorized detention and trial of those captured in Afghanistan with Guantanamo Bay as the facility for detention and eventual trial. Neither the Taliban or Al Qaeda members wore uniforms, nor did they fight in recognizable formations normally associated with traditional warfare. Another distinction from traditional war is that they were not "Germans" or "Japanese", as in
World War II. Rather they were from many different nations such as Yemen, Australia, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, all nations that we were on friendly terms with yet citizens of these and other nations were allegedly members of Al Qaeda. 24 As a result U.S. forces relied heavily on assertions by capturing forces such as the Northern Alliance, that individuals they turned over to U.S. forces were involved in armed attack or arrested for 6 other terrorist activities. 25 Several hundred men were captured and detained at Guantanamo Bay as enemy combatants without the indicia of certainty that normally accompanied war prisoners. In the absence of any form of process to proclaim their innocence, twelve of the detainees filed a complaint in U.S. District Court petitioning for, among other forms of relief, a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of their detention. 26 The cases, consolidated as Rasul v. Bush, were initially rejected by the district court for lack of jurisdiction fulfilling the aim of the administration to keep detention matters out of U.S. courts. However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reviewed the case. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's jurisdiction determination and held that even though Guantanamo Bay was not a sovereign possession of the U.S., the government exercised a sufficient amount of control to bring activities there under the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. It further held that because the writ of habeas corpus acts not on the person held but rather the captor that jurisdiction would attach. 27 The captor in this case of course was the Executive Branch acting under the Executive Order promulgated by President Bush. If the initial complaint was a form a lawfare, was it an unlawful tactic or a misuse of the law? The holding of our own Supreme Court would suggest that it was not. Rasul v. Bush stood for the proposition that an individual, alleged to be an enemy combatant, could seek review by a U.S. court to challenge the basis for his detention, since many claimed they had no involvement in the conflict at all. While the court recognized that the nation was at war and that a military response was justified, it was also a signal to the administration that its actions would not escape judicial scrutiny. 28 The Bush administration's concern regarding habeas petitions and the desire to avoid court involvement surfaced shortly after the 7 9/11 attacks. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) authored a memorandum to the General Counsel for the Department of Defense responding to an inquiry that asked whether a federal district court would have jurisdiction to entertain a writ of habeas corpus from a non U.S. citizen detainee held at Guantanamo Bay. 29 The opinion, authored by John Yoo and Patrick Philbin cautioned that the courts could find a way to hear such a petition, but under the circumstances it probably would not. 30 It was evident that Secretary Rumsfeld's concern of "judicilization" and the prospect of the enemy engaging in lawfare required an opinion on the chances of judicial intervention.
According to Jack Goldsmith, the head of the OLC from the fall of 2003 to the summer of 2004, an overriding concern of administration officials was to maintain as much unilateral authority to run the war with the President to the exclusion of not only the judiciary, but Congress. 31 This later turned out to be a fatal flaw in much of the administrations battle in the lawfare realm. The Supreme Court proved to be much more deferential to the Executive branch when it works in concert with the Congress than it is when the Executive acts unilaterally. 32 While Rasul established an important precedence it was not the only Supreme Court decision that impacted the notion of lawfare. The same day the Rasul opinion was released another case decision was released that dealt a further blow to the administrations go it alone approach.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen by birth, was captured in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance and turned over to U.S. forces shortly thereafter. He was transported to Guantanamo Bay and upon discovery that he was a U.S. citizen, transferred to the United States and held at a Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 33 Hamdi's father 8 filed a habeas petition claiming that his son was in Afghanistan for relief work and was not in the country long enough to have trained with the Taliban. 34 After the petition was denied by lower courts the case was granted a review by the Supreme Court. The Court held that Hamdi had a right to challenge his status as an enemy combatant and the only meaningful way for him to do so required the government to notify him of the basis for his detention and afford him the opportunity to be heard and challenge the factual basis for his detention. 35 The Court's holding did not limit the military's ability to capture an enemy combatant, nor did it impose any due process requirements during initial detention. It did however impose some due process for continued detention to allow what may be an innocent person a right to rebut the factual basis for his continual detention. 36 The court remanded the case back to the lower courts to address the merits of Hamdi's claim. 37 In the governments favor, the Court agreed that the AUMF authorized the President to capture and detain enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict as was the custom in other armed conflicts. 38 This holding in a sense made this a hybrid of traditional rules of war concerning detainees adding an element of U.S.
constitutional rights of due process. While the court acknowledged the government's right to capture and hold enemy combatants, it made clear that "a state of war is not blank check" for the President when making decisions concerning the detention of U.S.
citizens. 39 Despite the best efforts of administration officials and lawyers it was becoming rapidly clear that the judiciary would play a role in the current conflict.
Securing a basic right to challenge the factual basis for continued detention does not equate to an unfair advantage or propaganda victory for our enemies. If Rasul and
Hamdi was lawfare, it was only in the broadest sense since the outcome only required the U.S. to add elements of due process to the system but otherwise garnered no discernable strategic gain. enemy combatants for war crimes but also reinforced the habeas denial contained in the DTA. 41 The DTA established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) in an effort to comply with the Rasul and Hamdi rulings to provide detainees the limited due process rights mandated by the court. 42 Congress also designated the D.C. Circuit court as the sole reviewer of CSRT decisions but limited the review to determine whether or not the Department of Defense properly followed its own procedural rules. 43 Though the DTA and MCA were not unilateral administrative decisions, the limitations on habeas petitions continued the government's untenable position with respect to the earlier rulings in Rasul and Hamdi. The Supreme Court granted review to one of the habeas challenges by a detainee whose case was pending when the DTA was passed. Salim
Hamdan was a Guantanamo detainee who was alleged to be, among other things, the driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. 44 Charged with law of war violations of conspiring to attack civilians, to commit murder and to engage in terrorism, Hamdan challenged not only the lawfulness of his detention but the government's authority to try him by the military commission system set up under the President's Executive Order issued shortly after the 9/11 attacks. The Court determined that the DTA's jurisdiction limitation did not apply to Hamdan. 45 More importantly it found that the commission system in place at the time was seriously flawed and expressed doubts that conspiracy was a recognizable war crime. 46 In response to the Court's ruling, Congress passed the MCA and set up a commission system that addressed the concerns of the Court but reapplied the habeas restrictions drafted into the DTA. As a result of the MCA a number of pending habeas cases were consolidated for appeal to the D.C Circuit. 47 The consolidated cases, known as Boumediene v. Bush made their way to the Supreme Court to determine once again the legality of the habeas limitations placed on the Guantanamo detainees. 48 Boumediene v. Bush
In Boumediene, the Court reviewed the process of the CSRTs and determined that they were not a legitimate substitution for the right to challenge the legality of their detention. 49 The Court cited the lack of meaningful representation and the presumption of validity of the government's evidence against the detainee as falling short of habeas rights that the Supreme Court had established for non-citizen detainees in prior cases.
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Further the Court found that the DTA and MCA were unconstitutional attempts to strip the federal courts jurisdiction over detainee cases. 51 The Court's lengthy opinion boiled down to two requirements, first was a detainees right to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held illegally, and second, that federal courts must maintain the power to order release of an individual if he has been unlawfully detained. Taliban and Al Qaeda were not traditional enemy forces that we had faced in the past.
In the past battles fought were largely force on force, enemy soldiers were clearly identifiable and often captured immediately after a battle. This was mostly true in Iraq but not Afghanistan. While some detainees were captured in a combat zone, they did not wear uniforms, did not always carry arms openly making it difficult to know exactly what an individual's involvement was in the conflict. Additionally government conduct in wartime is now far more regulated and constrained by domestic criminal law, the War Powers Act, the Geneva Conventions and other war related statutes. 53 To create a detention scheme that did not give a potentially innocent person a chance to challenge his detention was a fundamentally unfair and unsound policy as evidenced not only by the Supreme Court decisions in the foregoing cases, but by the voluntary release of hundreds of detainees prior to the "end" to the conflict.
Torture
One of the most controversial aspects of the current conflict is the use, or alleged use of torture to gather intelligence from detainees. Part and parcel of the war on terror was the prevention of future attacks on the United States. 54 One readily apparent method of prevention was to know the enemies plans for future attacks.
Interrogation of captured combatants could reveal future plans or other actionable intelligence that would assist the government in preventing another attack. 55 Bush administration officials anticipated that because of the committed nature of the enemy, usual interrogation methods would not be effective. 56 This conclusion led the administration to seek legal guidelines on alternative techniques that could be used by government interrogators. 57 Torture, in its broadest sense had been formally outlawed by a federal statute that implemented the global treaty that banned its use. 58 The guidelines that the administration sought came from the OLC, in an opinion authored by John Yoo, the deputy to the Assistant Attorney General of the OLC. The opinion he drafted later became known as the infamous "torture memo." 59 The memo defined torture as "acts… that are specifically intended, to inflict severe pain or suffering, whether mental or physical." 60 The opinion further specified that to be considered torture, the infliction of physical pain "must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death." 61 Yoo's memo was controversial because of its narrow definition of torture and the contention that any act, however objectionable, that fell short of the definition was not torture. 62 The memo also states that the production of pain alone does not amount to torture unless 13 causing pain is the sole objective. 63 In other words an interrogator could cause a detainee pain if it is a by-product of intelligence gathering and not inflicted specifically for the sake of cruelty or punishment. The opinion was written not only to provide guidance to the field, it also served as a preemptive strike (reverse lawfare) against Al Qaeda's anticipated lawfare tactic of claiming abuse upon capture, by narrowing the legal definition of torture and providing legal defenses to interrogators. 64 Claims of torture were seen by many officials and commentators as another example of the enemy engaging in lawfare. Claiming abuse was a tactic allegedly advocated by Al Qaeda in a document that was referred to as "Manchester Manual." 65 The manual was recovered during a search on a suspected Al Qaeda member's home in Manchester, England, in 2000. concerning detainee abuse allegations Rumsfeld said "These detainees are trained to lie, they're trained to say they were tortured, and the minute we release them or the minute they get a lawyer, very frequently they'll go out and they will announce that they've been tortured. The media jumps on these claims, reporting them as "another example of torture, when in fact, (terrorists have) been trained to do that, and their training manual says so." 67 Conservative commentator and attorney David Rivkin repeated Rumsfeld's view claiming the manual instructs detained operatives to claim torture and mistreatment. 68 There is however, a twofold problem with this interpretation of the manual. The first problem is the fact that the manual was discovered in 2000, before the 9/11 attacks. CSRT's, created in response to the Supreme Court's ruling that detainees were entitled to some due process, were designed to keep lawyers out by providing detainees with a non-lawyer military officer as their representative. 72 The Supreme Court, in Boumediene determined that the CSRT's were inadequately designed to provide detainees with a meaningful process to challenge detention without the need to resort to filing a habeas claim. The court noted that assigning a "Personal Representative" that had no legal training and was not the detainee's advocate was one of the primary shortcomings of the CSRT process. 73 The various executive orders and legislative acts that sought to suppress legal process were in keeping with the Bush administration's strategy of countering the perceived enemy's use of lawfare.
In addition to the procedural aspects attempting to contain legal rights and As we now continue to engage terrorist threats worldwide, particularly with the increased reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) we must be cautious when investing too much authority in the executive branch to wage war. The unilateral decision making process currently in place (whatever that may be) is controlled solely by the Obama administration without any governing legislation much like the early detention program by the Bush administration. Without effectively engaging Congress soon, the use of UAVs to carry out killings will likely face the same legal challenges faced by the Bush administration causing a diminishment of U.S. world standing and a degradation of our own morality.
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